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FLIGHT RISK OR DANGER TO THE
COMMUNITY?
RODRIGUEZ AND THE
PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
CHARLIE KAZEMZADEH*
INTRODUCTION
As Lady Liberty stands guard on Liberty Island, NY, welcoming
foreign nationals to our shores, thousands upon thousands of aliens
hoping to secure legal status in the United States sit behind bars. Some
have committed crimes deemed egregious enough to warrant removal
from the United States, while others were held at the border because
they declared their intentions to file for asylum and remain in the
United States permanently for fear of persecution in their home
country. The Supreme Court is scheduled to address this very issue in
the upcoming case Jennings v. Rodriguez.1 Respondent Rodriguez
represents a class made up of individuals incarcerated under several
different statutes including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c),2 1225(b),3 and 1226(a),4
all of whom have been in prolonged custody without having any type

Copyright © 2017 Charlie Kazemzadeh.
*J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2018.
1. 136 S. Ct. 2498 (2016).
2. See 8 U.S.C § 1226(c) (2012) (“[S]ubjects certain aliens who are deportable or
inadmissible on account of their criminal history to mandatory detention pending proceedings to
remove them from the United States.”). See also Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th
Cir. 2013).
3. See 8 U.S.C § 1225(b) (2012) (providing that any “alien seeking admission [that] is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . shall be detained” in preparation for
removal). This includes asylum seekers held only because they declared that they wanted to
remain in the United States because they fear persecution if returned to their home country. See
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012). These aliens are alleged to have suffered persecution due to their
race, nationality, religion, political beliefs, or membership in a particular social group. See id.
4. 8 U.S.C § 1226(a) (2012) is a catch-all which provides the government with general
authority to arrest and detain any alien “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed
from the United States.”
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of bond hearing before a neutral adjudicator.5 All of these individuals
are in full removal proceedings, meaning that they intend to contest
their deportation.6 There is no timetable for the adjudication of their
cases,7 and on average, they have spent thirteen months in custody.8
These statutes have no built in time limitation on the length of
detention permitted, and no provision for habeas corpus–style
hearings, no matter how long an alien has been in detention.9
Respondents won several victories in the district and circuit courts,
which included a permanent injunction that forces the Government to
provide any alien incarcerated under the above statutes with
mandatory bond hearings.10 In these proceedings, the Government
must prove that the alien in question poses either a flight risk or a
danger to the community by clear and convincing evidence; if it fails to
do prove either, it must release the alien.11 Now, the Government
appeals both the required hearings, the shifting of the burden of proof,
and the heightened standard of proof.12 Given President Trump’s
zealous hardline stance against immigration, it is unlikely that his new
appointee, Neil Gorsuch, a historically conservative Court of Appeals
judge,13 would support increased protections for aliens. If the
President’s new appointee is confirmed and allowed to vote on this
case, the Ninth Circuit’s decision will likely be reversed. If the new
nominee abstains or is not confirmed in time, the Court will likely split
4-4, confirming the Ninth Circuit’s ruling without setting precedent.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Respondent Rodriguez entered to removal proceedings after being
found guilty of joyriding and drug possession, and is therefore a
5. Brief for Respondents at 8–9, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2498 (2016) (No. 151204) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
6. Id. at 1.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id. at 8.
9. See 8 U.S.C § 1226(c) (2012); 8 U.S.C § 1225(b) (2012); 8 U.S.C § 1226(a) (2012).
10. Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013); see also
Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom.
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2489 (2016).
11. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1090.
12. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Jennings v. Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 2498 (2016) (No. 15-1204)
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
13. Robert Barnes, Trump Picks Colo. Appeals Court Judge Neil Gorsuch for Supreme
Court, WASH. POST (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-picks-coloappeals-court-judge-neil-gorsuch-for-supreme-court/2017/01/31/2b08a226-e55e-11e6-a5475fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=.d6fb110d5fea.
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member of the section 1226(c) subclass.14 He is a lawful permanent
resident of the United States, along with his parents, siblings, and three
young children.15 Until 2003, his record was clean beyond a conviction
for joyriding.16 In 2003, however, he was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance, and sentenced to five years of probation.17 Upon
learning of these convictions, Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) initiated removal proceedings.18 In 2004, an immigration judge
(“IJ”) ruled that the joyriding conviction was an aggravated felony and
ordered Rodriguez to be removed from the United States.19 Because of
the aggravated felony determination, Rodriguez was ineligible for
relief from deportation (in the form of cancellation of removal).20 He
appealed the order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and
then to the Ninth Circuit, where the Government moved in 2005 to
forestall any decision in the case until the Supreme Court decided a
separate case.21
Rodriguez’s case remained in abeyance from 2005 until 2007.22
During that time, Rodriguez was the subject of four custody hearings
at ICE; the agency decided each time that he should remain
incarcerated until his case was decided on the merits.23 Rodriguez
instituted a habeas petition while he was still in ICE custody.24 When
he applied for class certification in mid-2007, the Government released
him and attempted to argue that his release “mooted the case and made
him an unfit Class representative.”25 By that point, he had been in jail
for 1,189 days.26
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit ruled that driving a stolen car was not an
aggravated felony.27 The removal proceeding related to the joyriding
charge was vacated, and the case was remanded to the BIA to resolve

14. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 5–6.
15. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1073.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (writing that the Ninth Circuit agreed to hold the case in abeyance until the resolution
of Gonzales v. Penuliar, 549 U.S. 1178 (2007)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 6.
26. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1073.
27. Penuliar v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 603, 614 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the drug possession charge.28 He was successfully able to apply for and
win cancellation of removal and retain his lawful permanent status,
over seven years after his case began.29 During this time, he spent over
three years in jail, his family struggled to make ends meet without him,
and he missed the birth of his daughter.30
On average, class members have been incarcerated for thirteen
months.31 Twenty percent have been incarcerated for over 18 months,
and ten percent for over two years.32 The Ninth Circuit heard
Rodriguez’s case three times, first in 2009 after the district court
refused to certify the class.33 The Court of Appeals reversed.34
The case came back before the Ninth Circuit in 2013 after the
district court granted Rodriguez a preliminary injunction with regard
to the section 1225(b) and 1226(c) subclass members.35 The Ninth
Circuit ordered the Government to “provide each [detainee] with a
bond hearing” before an IJ and to “release each Subclass member on
reasonable conditions of supervision . . . unless the government shows
by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is justified
based on his or her danger to the community or risk of flight.”36 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction.37
Most recently, the case returned to the Ninth Circuit in 2015 after
the district court entered a permanent injunction against the
Government.38 The court extended the preliminary injunction
protections to include the section 1226(a) subclass, and ordered the
Government to provide detainees with automatic recorded hearings by
the 195th day of incarceration.39 The district court refused to order IJs
to consider length of detainment or the odds a detainee would actually
be deported during the hearings.40

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1073.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 6–7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Rodriguez v. Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1126.
Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013).
Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015).
Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1133.
Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1071–72.
Id.
Id.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The authority to incarcerate class members comes from § 1225(b),
§ 1226(c), and § 1226(a). These statutes, however, remain silent with
regard to any limits on the amount of time an individual in removal
proceedings can be detained without some type of bond hearing.41
Section 1226(a) does provide that an individual may request a bond
hearing, but there is no requirement that the Government grant any
request.42 The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit both have extensive
case law dealing with the issue of civil detention.43 In interpreting these
statutes, the courts have been careful to abide by the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance, which states that courts should decide issues
on non-constitutional grounds and only base rulings on the
Constitution as a last resort.44
A. Civil Detention
The Supreme Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis that civil
incarceration is only acceptable “in certain special and narrow nonpunitive circumstances, where a special justification . . . outweighs the
individual’s constitutionally protected interest.”45 The Court has also
determined that criminal defendants deemed unfit for trial may only
be incarcerated for the “reasonable period of time necessary to
determine whether there is a substantial probability that [the
defendant] will attain [the] capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable
future.” 46
It is an established principle that aliens in deportation proceedings
are just as entitled to due process protections as anyone else.47 The
Court made it clear in Zavdydas that a statute allowing indefinite
detention for aliens in removal proceedings without some type of
periodic bond hearing would be constitutionally suspect given the Fifth
Amendment’s requirement that no one be deprived of liberty without

41. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a), (c), and § 1225(b) (2012).
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
43. See, e.g., Zavdydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 951 (9th Cir. 2008).
44. See, e.g., Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1083.
45. 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
46. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
47. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting indefinite detention of an
alien would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
forbids the Government to ‘depriv[e]” any “person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of
law.’”)
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due process.48 The Court held that incarceration under § 1231(a)(6) was
limited to the time “reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s
removal from the United States.”49 By building in an implicit time limit,
the Supreme Court was able to dispose of the case without striking
down any federal law as unconstitutional.50
Conversely, the Supreme Court has not ignored the strong
governmental interest in keeping certain categories of aliens
incarcerated.51 The Court recognized in Demore v. Kim52 that
incarceration powers found in statutes such as § 1226(c) were enacted
to combat the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (“INS”)
complete inability to keep dangerous criminals in check.53 The INS’s
inability to deport removable aliens placed enormous cost on
taxpayers, and statistics showed deportable aliens were committing
more crimes prior to being removed.54 Congressional investigations
determined that the INS was handcuffed by its inability to detain
removable aliens who would often disappear and fail to appear for
their removal hearings.55
Given these considerations, the Court in Demore held that, given
the average mandatory incarceration time of 6 weeks for aliens who do
not appeal, and the average incarceration time of 5 months for aliens
who do appeal, mandatory incarceration is not unconstitutional.56 The
Court in Demore was clear to base its decision on the limited nature of
the incarceration times and remained silent on the constitutionality of
incarcerations lasting longer than six months.57 Further, in Shaughnessy
v. United States ex rel. Mezei (“Mezei”),58 the Court found that the 21month incarceration of an alien at Ellis Island as he awaited exclusion
did not violate his constitutional rights.59 The Court in Shaughnessy

48. Id.
49. Id. at 689.
50. See id.
51. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518 (2003).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 518−519.
56. Id. at 531.
57. See id. at 530−531 (finding that the lengths of detention at stake in the current case “last
roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which it is invoked, and about five
months in the minority of cases in which the alien chooses to appeal”).
58. 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
59. Id. at 216.
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characterized the alien’s situation not as incarceration awaiting
removal proceedings, but simply continued exclusion from the shores
of the United States.60
B. Defining “Reasonably Necessary”
With regard to specific temporal limitations, the Supreme Court has
held that six months is the presumptive upper limit of “reasonable”
incarceration without additional evidence.61 Considering the Court’s
decision in Zadvydas, the Ninth Circuit determined that an
incarceration becomes “prolonged” if it has lasted six months and is
expected to continue.62 The court characterized the situation at that
point as one where “the private interests at stake are profound,” and
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a
hearing before a neutral decision maker is substantial.”63 In Rodriguez
II, the Ninth Circuit ruled that to avoid these “constitutional
concerns, § 1226(c)’s mandatory language must be construed ‘to
contain an implicit reasonable time limitation.’”64 The court reasoned
that the Government’s incarceration power under § 1226(c) ended
after a reasonable period.65 After this point, the power instead came
from § 1226(a), which itself had a mandatory bond hearing
requirement.66
Also in Rodriguez II, the Ninth Circuit extended the protections
espoused in Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security
against prolonged incarceration without bond hearings to persons
incarcerated under § 1225(b).67 The court found that incarceration
under § 1225(b), much like § 1226(c), was time limited.68 After the six
month mark, the “mandatory incarceration” requirement espoused in
the statute expired, and § 1225(b) no longer governed aliens’
incarceration; that authority shifted to § 1226(a), which, as noted above,
has been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit to contain mandatory bond
hearings every six months.69

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 215.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1092 n.13 (9th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1092.
Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682).
Id. at 1144 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 680).
535 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2008).
Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1137–38 (citing Casas, 535 F.3d at 951).
Id. at 1144.
Id.
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C. Proposed Remedy to Constitutional Concerns
The Ninth Circuit held in Rodriguez II that “the prolonged
detention of an alien [under either § 1225(b) or § 1226(c)] without an
individualized determination of his dangerousness or flight risk would
be constitutionally doubtful.”70 The court also determined, given the
serious nature of the consequences of the hearing, that the
Government was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the alien was a danger to the community or a flight risk.71
III. HOLDING
In Rodriguez v. Robbins (“Rodriguez III”), the Ninth Circuit
clarified that the reasoning and decision in Rodriguez II was still
controlling law with regard to the incarceration of aliens under §
1225(b) and § 1226(c), and decided the remaining questions under the
same theories of due process.72
A. § 1226(c) and § 1226(a) Subclasses
With regard to § 1226(c) class members, the court affirmed
Rodriguez’s summary judgment motion as well as the permanent
injunction against the Government.73 The court ordered that any alien
imprisoned under this statute for six months or more was entitled to an
individual hearing where the Government was forced to prove that the
alien was either a flight risk or a danger to his community by a
preponderance of the evidence.74 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, since
§ 1226(c) contains an implicit “reasonable time limitation” to an alien’s
incarceration, § 1226(c) does not afford the Government the right to
hold anyone for more than six months.75 Instead, at the six month mark,
the Government’s power to incarcerate comes from § 1226(a), which
itself contains an implicit requirement that every alien held over six
months be afforded a bond hearing.76

70. Id. at 1137–38 (quoting Casas, 535 F.3d at 951) (emphasis added).
71. Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 427 (1979)).
72. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d 1060, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015).
73. Id. at 1090.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1079−1080.
76. Id.
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B. § 1225(b) Subclass
The Ninth Circuit also affirmed the district court’s decision
regarding Rodriguez’s summary judgment motion and permanent
injunction ordering the Government to provide aliens detained under
§ 1225(b) mandatory bond hearings every six months.77 The court again
held that incarcerations under § 1225(b) are implicitly time limited, and
that any alien incarcerated over the six month period is no longer
legally incarcerated under § 1225(b), but instead under § 1226(a).78
These subclass members are protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and thus are entitled to bond hearings.79 Applying the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, the Ninth Circuit read-in an
implicit bond hearing requirement instead of striking down the
statute.80
C. Procedural Requirements
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the
Government must prove an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to
his community by clear and convincing evidence.81 In making this
determination, the court relied heavily on Singh v. Holder, which cited
the substantial interests at stake in prolonged deprivations of liberty.82
The court reasoned that “when the period of detention becomes
prolonged, ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official
action’ is more substantial; greater procedural safeguards are therefore
required.”83
The court also ordered IJs to take into account length of detention
and likelihood of successful removal in the future in their
determinations.84 Relying on Diouf, the court reasoned that the longer
an individual was incarcerated or was to be incarcerated in the future,
the more substantial his due process argument becomes: “a non-citizen
detained for one or more years is entitled to greater solicitude than a
non-citizen detained for six months.”85 In balancing the interests

77. Id. at 1082.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1074.
80. Id. at 1082–1083.
81. Id. at 1087.
82. Id. (citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011)).
83. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
84. Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1089.
85. Id.
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involved, IJs are instructed to add extra weight where the alien has
been incarcerated for an especially prolonged period of time or where
it is likely that the alien will remain in custody for an extended period.86
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. The Government’s Arguments
The Government argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that
§ 1226(c) and § 1225(b) contain an implicit reasonable time limit on
incarcerations authorized under these statutes.87 The Government
argues that both statutes plainly and unambiguously require aliens held
under their authority to be incarcerated, and that such an
interpretation is supported by Congress’s intent and the purposes of
the statutes.
In considering § 1225(b), the Government turns first to the statute’s
language, arguing that the language stating that any alien who is “not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted . . . shall be detained”
pending a proceeding to determine removability clearly shows that the
government has the authority they claim.88 The Government further
argues that this mandate includes aliens claiming asylum: any alien
intending to apply for asylum “shall be detained” until a “credible fear”
determination can be made, and if that alien is found to have a credible
fear, that alien “shall be detained” until final consideration of their
asylum claim.89 The Government argues that the word “shall” does not
leave any room for discretion on any IJ’s part, and that it is a
requirement that any alien fitting the above description be
incarcerated.90 The Government concedes an exception to this
requirement in the form of a grant of parole by the Attorney General,
but only in cases of “urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit.”91 The Government argues that “where Congress . . .
enumerates . . . exceptions . . . [,] additional exceptions are not to be
implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent,”92 and that no
such contrary purpose exists here. This argument is bolstered by federal
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 12, at 10.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (B)(ii), (iii)(V) (emphasis added).
Kingdomware Tech. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A), (B) (2012).
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001).

FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

FLIGHT RISK OR DANGER TO THE COMMUNITY?

2/15/2017 10:20 AM

107

regulations, which state that IJs have no power to hold bond hearings
for “arriving aliens in removal proceedings.”93
Turning to Congressional intent, the Government argues that
affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision would contravene
Congress’s purpose in enacting § 1225(b). Citing Demore, the
Government argues the purpose of these statutes was to ensure that
aliens unfit for entry were actually barred from entering and kept in
custody to effectuate their removal.94 The Government also points to
statistics regarding flight and absence from removal hearings as
evidence that bond hearings would seriously impair the authorities’
ability to control the border.95 Finally, the Government argues that the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling would create perverse incentives for arriving
aliens, motivating them to extend their cases beyond six months in the
interest of release into the general population.96 Once released, these
aliens would disappear.97
The Government contends that this reading of § 1225(b) poses no
constitutional issue because Congress has plenary power to determine
the process by which aliens are admitted to this country free from the
judiciary’s influence. This power has been confirmed repeatedly by the
Supreme Court.98 The Government points to decisions such as Mezei
and Landon v. Plasencia,99 which bolster Congress’s power in the field
of immigration control.
The Government’s argument regarding § 1226(c) is similarly
structured; it begins with the statutory language, which it argues is clear,
unambiguous, and constitutional on its face. Next, the Government
examines congressional intent and statutory purpose, which it also finds
to be clearly in favor of plenary power to incarcerate. The Government
again points to the directive that it “shall take into custody” aliens
convicted of certain crimes to argue that there is no room for IJs to
exercise any discretion with regard to bonds.100 It also makes another
TRW argument, writing that there is only one exception to § 1226(c)’s

93. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(h)(2)(i)(B) (2012).
94. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
95. Id. at 519–520.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
99. 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (holding that an alien seeking admission has no constitutional
protections regarding his admission).
100. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(A), (B) (2012).
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incarceration requirement,101 and that no other exception can be
implied without contrary legislative intent, none of which can be found
here.102
The Government’s § 1226(c) argument continues to track its §
1225(b) theory, positing that mandatory bond hearings are counter to
Congress’s intent and the purpose of § 1226(c). The Government again
turns to Demore, arguing that Congress intended for aliens
incarcerated under the statute to remain behind bars until the
completion of their proceedings.103 It argues that in enacting § 1226(c),
Congress made a “categorical judgment” that aliens incarcerated under
the statute were risks to the community.104
The Government moves to distinguish and narrow Zavdydas’s
effective scope regarding § 1226(c) incarceration by arguing its holding
only applies to peculiar cases in which it was clear that the class in
question would be permanently detained with no possibility of
removal.105 It argues that Zavdydas should be limited to such cases
where aliens cannot be removed to a different country; in all other
cases, Demore should control.106 The Government takes Demore as an
implicit blessing from the Court that such incarcerations are generally
admissible, and argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in extending
Zavdydas’s protections to aliens who have any possibility whatsoever
of being removed.107
Finally, the Government argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in
shifting and raising the burden of proof, by requiring automatic
rehearings every six months, and requiring IJs to consider the length of
incarceration in their bond determinations. The Government points to
§ 1226(c)’s language that necessarily forces the alien to prove that he
will neither flee, nor be a danger to the community.108 It makes a similar
101. See id. § 1226(c)(1) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any
alien who” is inadmissible or deportable).
102. See TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28 (2001) (“Where Congress . . . enumerates . . .
exceptions . . . additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary legislative
intent.”).
103. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 520–21 (2003).
104. See Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486, 497 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]he animating force behind §
1226(c) is its categorical and mandatory treatment of a certain class of criminal aliens.”).
105. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 738 (1972)) (“Where detention’s goal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer
‘bear[s][a] reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.’”).
106. See id.
107. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (holding that the six months detention of an alien in removal
proceedings was authorized by § 1226(c)).
108. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2) (2012).
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argument with regard to § 1225(b), given that the statute requires that
an alien prove “clearly and beyond a doubt” that he is entitled to
admission into the country.109
The Government argues that the history and practice of § 1226(a)
does not support recurring bond hearings. It cites federal regulations,
which require an initial bond determination by DHS, and the
opportunity, if denied, for aliens to seek a redetermination from an IJ.110
It argues that this bond determination and appeal procedure satisfy any
due process concerns. Finally, the Government argues the alien’s flight
risk and danger to the community are the only factors that should be
considered during a bond determination.111
B. Rodriguez’s Arguments
In arguing for affirmation of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Rodriguez
cites due process protections against prolonged incarceration without
review, and a history of case law from both the Supreme Court and the
Ninth Circuit supporting periodic hearings for incarcerated aliens.
Much of Respondent’s brief tracks the same language used in the Ninth
Circuit’s Rodriguez III opinion. He cites decisions such as Addington v.
Texas112 and Jackson v. Indiana113 arguing that due process requires the
Government to show that anyone held without bond is either a flight
risk or a danger to the community. Respondent relies heavily on
Zavdydas to support the notion that aliens incarcerated pursuant to
removal proceedings are owed mandatory and regularly occurring
bond hearings regardless of Congress’s power to regulate immigration
standards.114 Other circuits have recognized that due process
protections apply not only to aliens who have already entered the
United States (§ 1226(c)), but also to aliens refused entry and held at
the border (§ 1225(b)).115
With regard to the interpretation of the statutes in question,
Respondent argues that Congress intended to build in a limit to the
time an alien could be incarcerated. Respondent also points to §
1226(a)(7) of the Patriot Act, which requires the Government to
109. 8. U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), § 1229a(c)(2).
110. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (2012).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f )(2), § 3143(b)(1)(A) (2012).
112. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
113. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
114. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
115. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005); Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386,
408 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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incarcerate aliens right up until they are actually removed from the
country.116 It posits that interpreting § 1226(c) to allow the Government
to do the same without similar language would render that clause of
the Patriot Act superfluous.117
With regard to § 1225(b), Respondent contends that the statute
only applies from the time that an alien is apprehended up until the
point removal proceedings begin.118 Given this language, it argues
Congress clearly intended incarcerations under § 1225(b) to be time
limited.119 Since § 1225(b) does not govern prolonged incarceration, the
authority can only be found in § 1226(a)120 which contains an implicit
bond hearing requirement.121
Respondent claims that the procedural requirements espoused by
the Ninth Circuit, including the clear and convincing standard,
recurring hearings every six months, and the IJs’ consideration of
length of detention are all necessary to satisfy the Constitution’s due
process requirements. Citing Addington, it asserts that the deprivation
of liberty is such a serious consequence that the Government should be
forced to prove that the alien is either a flight risk or danger to the
community by a higher standard of proof to ensure innocent people do
not remain behind bars.122 With regard to the recurring hearings and
the consideration of length of detention, Respondent argues that the
interest of an incarcerated alien to gain his freedom grows each day he
is behind bars.123
Respondent categorically denies the Government’s assertions that
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling contravenes the Court’s opinions in Demore
and Mezei. It argues that Demore can be easily distinguished here
because the Court in Demore was dealing with brief detentions,
averaging six weeks with a maximum of five months.124 Respondent
contends that Mezei only applies to aliens who have been denied entry
and summarily ordered removed due to national security concerns,
116. See Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) (holding that statutes must be
interpreted to avoid rendering superfluous any language contained therein).
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
118. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012).
119. See id.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2012).
121. Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2008).
122. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 (1979).
123. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).
124. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 530–31 (2003).
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which by their nature precluded them from any type of full removal
proceeding.125
Finally, Respondent argues that habeas corpus petitions do not
provide nearly enough protection to satisfy the rigorous due process
requirements of the Fifth Amendment. The Government argues that
the only time an alien should be released is if it itself has caused
unreasonable delay in adjudicating his case;126 since the delays are very
rarely unreasonably caused by the government, habeas hearings
granted on a case by case basis are more than enough to protect
aliens.127 The Government suggests that few, if any, class members are
ever successful in winning their release at bond hearings.128 Respondent
counters this assertion by showing that 70% of class members have
been found eligible for release.129
V. ANALYSIS
The Court should rule in favor of Rodriguez. First, the Government
has failed to show any source of statutory authority to detain aliens in
removal proceedings without so much as a bond hearing. While in
theory this issue could be remedied by congressional action, the
Government has also failed to justify the constitutionality of such
power in the face of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Although not officially confirmed, the Senate is set to vote on the
nomination of the late Justice Scalia’s replacement, Neil Gorsuch,
whose ascension would restore the Supreme Court to its full lineup of
nine justices.130 Given Gorsuch’s conservative tendencies,131 the case
may turn on whether the Court delivers the opinion without rehearing,
or decides to re-open the case in order to allow Gorsuch to be included
in the decision. Were he allowed to vote, he would likely decide against
the Ninth Circuit and in favor of the Government. If the Court goes
forward without him, it will likely split 4-4 and affirm the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling without creating precedent.

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215–216 (1953).
Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 12, at 40.
Id. at 26 n.7.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 11.
Barnes, supra note 13.
Id.
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A. No Person Shall Be Deprived of Liberty Without Due Process
The Government has likely not done enough to show how a statute
authorizing the prolonged detention of aliens without bond hearings
can be reconciled with the protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment. The Amendment provides that “no person shall be . . .
deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.”132 Incarceration
is the ultimate deprivation of civil liberty, and any man, woman, or child
under the jurisdiction of the United States is entitled to have his or her
case heard by an impartial adjudicator.133 The Court recognized in
Foucha v. Louisiana that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”134
Courts have applied these protections to citizens and non-citizens alike,
regardless of their perceived inadmissibility to the United States.135 The
Supreme Court has read-in limitations on the powers conferred to
Congress, citing the constitutional avoidance doctrine.136 The Court
made sure to emphasize that it made no difference that there were
constitutionally sound applications of the statutes; as long as there is
some constitutional concern regarding some class of individuals
governed by the law, it may be altered to avoid said constitutional
concerns.137
The granting of bond hearings would not frustrate the protections
that Congress intended to establish. By definition, these bond hearings
would keep any alien found to be a flight risk or dangerous behind bars.
They would instead serve to avoid the arbitrary and unnecessary
incarceration of individuals with established lives and extremely
compelling reasons to appear at their hearings.
Moreover, outside of the § 1226 class members, the rest of the class
members are not behind bars because of any criminal activity. The bond
hearings will prevent arbitrary incarcerations such as the one suffered
by an Ethiopian § 1225(b) subclass member who was subjected to

132. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
133. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to
justify civil commitment because “[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause”).
134. Id.
135. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380 (2005); see also Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d
386, 406–407 (2003).
136. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237−238 (1998).
137. Clark, 543 U.S. at 380 (“It is not at all unusual to give a statute’s ambiguous language a
limiting construction called for by one of the statute’s applications, even though other of the
statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the same limitation.”).
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brutal torture by the Ethiopian government, only to spend ten months
in custody while his asylum case was adjudicated.138 During his one
parole hearing, he was denied release because there was a similarity
amongst the stories of “Somalian detainee’s [sic] that present a
paradigm of deceit.”139 Apparently escaping the DHS officer charged
with making the parole determination was that the man before him was
Ethiopian.140 Stories such as this highlight the need for individualized
hearings before neutral arbitrators.
With the nomination of Neil Gorsuch by President Trump, and his
decidedly conservative history,141 his availability to vote on the issue
will likely determine the outcome of the case. With the return of a full
nine justice lineup, the best indicators of the Court’s likely decision rest
with the viewpoint of its median justice on any issue. In this case, the
median justice will likely be Justice Kennedy. Given Justice Kennedy’s
dissent in Zavdydas, it is unlikely that he shares the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of the statutes in question. In his dissent, Justice
Kennedy wrote that the lack of a time limitation in the statutes was a
clear indication that Congress intended the statutes to bestow
unlimited incarceration power.142 While it can be argued that the Court
is bound by stare decisis to rule in favor of the class, there is a lot of
ambiguity in the Zadvydas decision. The five conservative justices
(assuming Gorsuch’s confirmation) could use this to distinguish it from
the current case.
B. Power to Incarcerate
Due process challenges aside, the Government has also failed to
show any of the statutes governing the incarceration of aliens in
removal proceedings actually grant it the authority to detain aliens for
a prolonged period of time. As mentioned above, in both the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Rodriguez III, and Respondent’s argument, the
courts take civil incarceration very seriously.143 The Supreme Court in
United States v. Salerno144 found that in order to remand a defendant
138. Brief for Respondents, supra note 5, at 6.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Barnes, supra note 13.
142. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 705 (2001).
143. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996) (quoting Santosky v. Cramer, 455 U.S.
746, 756 (1982)) (“[D]ue process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil
proceedings in which the ‘individual interests at stake . . . are both particularly important and
more substantial than mere loss of money.’”).
144. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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without bail, the government must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that nothing can be reasonably done to ensure the safety of
the community if the defendant were released.145
Here, given that we are dealing with individuals handicapped by
language and cultural barriers, and the intentionally high bar governing
civil commitment, it follows that Congress should be forced to explicitly
grant its agents the power to detain an alien indefinitely without bond.
The idea that a silent, or at best ambiguously worded, statute should be
interpreted to afford the government the right to engage in
constitutionally suspect activities is inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment. Congress has enacted statutes that specifically grant its
agents the right to keep certain types of aliens, namely those designated
national security risks, incarcerated for as long as necessary to
effectuate their removal.146 To interpret these two statues to confer the
similar powers to the government would violate canons on statutory
interpretation guiding courts not to render statutory language
superfluous.147
CONCLUSION
The Court should rule in favor of Respondent Rodriguez not only
in the interest of protecting the civil liberties guaranteed everyone by
the Constitution, but because the civil incarceration of an individual
not found to be a risk to the community simply because he lacks an
artificially created “status” is inherently unjust. There is no material
difference between a citizen and legal permanent resident’s character,
but for ordinary Americans, the concept that a citizen can commit a
minor drug offense and be released on bail is common, while the
granting of bail to an alien who may not have a single offense on their
record is unpalatable. This distinction lacks reason and logic, and
instead represents an arbitrary and discriminatory application of the
laws.

145. Id. at 750.
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1226a(a)(7) (2012).
147. See Clark v. Rameker, 134 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 (2014) (holding that statutes must be
interpreted to avoid rendering superfluous any language contained therein).

